Abstract In governance arrangements on the local, state, regional and international levels, lobbying as a strategy to gain influence on policy outcomes via informal channels takes place. While most studies focus on how individuals, companies, interest groups or non-governmental organizations try to exert influence via state actors, we know much less about whether and how frequently states themselves engage in lobbying. How effectively do state actors seek to further their own preferences informally in lobbying institutional key actors in governance arrangements beyond the nation-state? To shed light on these blind spots, this article draws on the example of the European Union and analyses the conditions under which states are especially inclined to use this informal influence strategy as well as the conditions for lobbying success. Is shows that states use lobbying strategies more often, the more capacities they possess, the lower the transaction costs of lobbying and also the stronger their incentives of getting active are for particular policies. Additionally, it is not only a high frequency of lobbying that increases the chances of informally influencing policies, but also the type of reasoning applied, its quality and its fit to the nature of the issue at stake.