Abstract In this article it will be argued that good use of the instrument of deference might help the EU courts to deal with the situation of pluralism that is currently visible in the European legal order. By means of deferential judicial review, the EU courts can pay due respect to national constitutional traditions and to national legislative and policy choices, thus preventing situations of real conflict. In addition, deference enables the EU courts to take into account the intricacies related to judicial review of norms drafted by co-equal institutions or by national elected bodies. Although the EU courts already make use of some form of deferential review, they may use the instrument in a clearer and more structured manner. As a basis for the development of a European ''doctrine of deference'', a comparison will be made with the margin of appreciation doctrine devised by the European Court of Human Rights. Although this doctrine is certainly not fault-free, it offers a number of advantages in terms of clarity and controllability. If improved and adapted on the basis of theoretical notions of procedural democracy, the doctrine might be put to good use by the EU courts.